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1. Individual-level predicates 
One of the defining characteristics of an individual-level (I-level) predicate is that 
it does not allow existential readings for bare plurals in subject position. (See, for 
example, (Carlson 1 977 ,  Kratzer 1 988 and Diesing 1 988 . )  Consider the following 
examples, where monkeys, students and dogs receive only the generic reading 
(roughly "all/most") in their respective sentences. 
( 1 )  Monkeys are mammals .  
(2)  Students are industrious .  
(3)  Dogs love meat. 
(4) Students own sports cars. 
The two main approaches in  the l iterature to the analysis of bare plural s ,  those 
of Carlson and of Kratzer/Diesing l are able to explain this observation, at least 
for bare plurals in subject position.2 Carlson 1 977,  for example, treats I-level 
predicates as predicates of kinds, leading to the prediction that bare plural subj ects 
of I-level predicates wi l l  receive only generic readings. Note that in  the Carlson 
and KratzerlDiesing accounts, I-level predicates are identified, at least roughly, 
with permanent or near-permanent properties, although Carlson points out that 
this correspondence is not complete . 
A number of exceptions have been observed to the general ization that 1-
level predicates allow only generic readings for their bare plural subjects (see, 
for example, Fernald 1 994) . I t  i s  not very difficult to think of further exceptions .  
Consider the following: 
(5) Students own sports cars in this department. 
The existential reading for students is  readily avai lable here . I t  is  interesting to 
compare this with (4) , where i t  is very difficult, if  not impossible, to get the exis­
tential reading. Now consider: 
(6) Monkeys live in trees. 
where it is  very difficult or impossible to get the existential reading for monkeys, 
and compare :  
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(7 )  Monkeys live in that tree. 
where it i s  not difficult to get an existential reading. (This example i s  taken from 
Fernald 1 994. )  And consider: 
(8) Drinkers were under-age. 
where it i s  difficult to get an existential reading, and compare : 
(9) I was shocked to discover in the Red Lion last night that drinkers were 
under-age. 
where the existential reading is readily available. Similarly, compare : 
( 1 0) Men are bald. 
(existential reading very difficult or impossible) 
( 1 1 )  Men are bald as a result of using this brand of hair restorer. 
(existential reading readily available). 
Before considering what is  responsible for the emergence of the existen­
tial reading in the second of each of these pairs of examples, let us check that the 
phenomenon i s  not a result of the predicates in question not being truly "perma­
nent" or I-level .  First, note that this would not explain the difference between the 
examples in each pair, given that the predicate is the same in each. Secondly, note 
that the effect i s  the same even when a predicate that is  unarguably permanent is 
used. 
( 1 2) Ministers are gay. 
(existential reading very difficult or impossiblc) 
( 1 3 ) In this church, ministers are gay. 
(existential reading available) . So we see that predicates for which this effect 
is observed do not correspond to "borderline" I-level predicates that have been 
"coerced" (to use Kratzer's term) to stage-level predicates (temporary propcrties) .  
What is  going on here ,  then? We seem to have some kind of contextual 
effect. The extra context supplied by the second of each pair of sentences some­
how makes avai lable the existential reading for the subject bare plural. These 
"contextually-supplied" existential readings are not predicted by the classical ac­
counts, and it is not at all obvious how to modify these accounts in  order to explain 
these unexpected existential readings. 
First, we need to be clear about exactly what kind of contextual effect 
is present. The effect has already been noticed by Fernald ( 1 994), who calls i t  
the ' definiteness effect ' ,  noting that the presence of definite NPs, as in (7 ) ,  and 
other constructions such as PPs denoting specific locations, appear to make the 
existenti al reading easier to obtain .  
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Fernald attempts to modify both the Carlson and KratzerlDiesing accounts 
to accommodate the definiteness effect. He shows that this i s  an extremely diffi­
cult, i f  not  impossible, task, particularly when one takes into account the  extensive 
range of syntactic constructions that can have this effect. 
Furthermore, as I will show below, the definiteness effect can be observed 
even in cases where there is  no explicit syntactic construction giving rise to it. My 
examples below show that discourse context alolle may give rise to the conditions, 
whatever they are, that allow existential readings to emerge for bare plural subjects 
of I-level predicates .  Consider the following:  
( 1 4) John was shocked by his visit to the Red Lion. Drinkers were under-age, 
drugs were on sale, and a number of fights broke out while he was there . 
In this discourse, the first sentence is responsible for establishing the "definite­
ness" (which I prefer to call the "situatedness"-see below) of the scenario de­
scribed in the following sentence (where we can get an existential reading for 
drinkers) .  That is ,  there is no syntactic element of the second sentence which can 
be said to be responsible for enabling the existential reading. 
I t  is difficult to see how the Carlson and Kratzer/Diesing accounts could 
be modified, along the lines suggested by Fernald or indeed along any other lines, 
to account for a purely contextual effect l i ke this .  
In  this paper I propose an analysis which accounts for such discourse con­
text effects on the availability of existential readings for bare plural subjects of 
I-level predicates .  My account i s  based on a modified version of Glasbey 1 995 
and Glasbey 1 996. These papers give : 
• A situation-theoretic analysis of bare plurals which accounts for the read­
ings available for bare plurals in both subject and object posi tions; 
• An account of the effect of context on existential readings for bare plural 
subjects of adjectival predicates. 
I will begin by giving a short summary of the contents of these two papers, 
in order to famil iarize the reader with the concepts and notation to be used in the 
analysis to fol low. The interested reader should consult these papers for further 
detai l s .  
2 .  Situation-Theoretic Account of  Bare Plural Interpretation 
The situation-theoretic account of bare plural interpretation is based on 
the distinction between two kinds of predicate-relations and types-that can 
be made in situation theory (ST). I use the Extended Kamp Notation (EKN) of 
Barwise and Cooper 1 993,  and the version of situation theory defined in that paper. 
Propositions in EKN include objects of the form: 
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chase(X,Y) 
which is the proposition that a situation S supports the infon 1 chase(X,Y) I. A 
proposition like this one is called an Austinian proposition. A second kind of 
situation theoretic proposition is exemplified by : 
dangerous 
which is the proposition that an i ndividual X is of the type dangerous. No situa­
tion is involved here. I call this a Russellian proposition.3 
I propose that a certain class of predicates ,  roughly corresponding to the 
I-level predicates in the l iterature, correspond to ST types (and thus can form only 
Russell ian propositions), while a second class of predicates (roughly correspond­
ing to S-level ones) correspond to ST relations (and can form either Austinian 
propositions or Russel l ian ones) .4 
In addition, I take bare plurals to denote situation theoretic types,''' 
The non-generic reading ( i .e . ,  the "single event" reading) of: 
( 1 5 ) Dogs barked. 
i s  represented as: 6 
bark( dog, T, P) 
where dog i s  the type of dog objects.7 
Thus the denotation of bare plurals differs from that of, say, proper names or 
pronouns, which are normally taken in situation theory to denote individuals . 
Now compare : 
( 1 6) Hurricanes are dangerous .  
which is taken to denote the truth of the proposit ion: 
hurricane I 
dangerous 
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where hurricane is the type of hurricane objects . Further information can be 
derived from such a proposition. I show in  Glasbey 1 995 how we can use Channel 
Theory (Barwise and Seligman 1 994) to express the information we can derive 
about the generic relation between being a hurricane and being dangerous .  
Here, I concentrate on existential readings. Consider again the representa­
tion for the event reading of ( 1 5) .  
bark(dog, T ,  P) 
I propose that if a bare plural type is an argument of a relation, forming 
an infon which is supported by a situation, then an inference can be made to the 
effect that there are (at least two) instantiations of the bare plural type . Thus the 
truth of the above proposition allows us to infer that: 
:3 2 X s . t .  
:3 SI , T' , pi  s . t .  bark(X, T' , Pi) i s  true. 
(Note that the proposition denoted here is  a restricted proposition-the 
restriction being denoted by the i nner box, to the right of the double l i ne .  The 
idea is that the entire restricted proposition only has a truth value if the restricting 
proposition, 
i s  true--otherwise it fai ls to denote . )  
The inference is that there are at least two instances of X.  That is ,  we infer 
that some (at least two) dogs barked . 8 
Thus the information about particular instances of the type dog and their 
participation in the relevant proposition is  not information that i s  directly de­
scribed by ( 1 5) ,  but is ,  rather, information that is obtained indirectly by a process 
of inference. The fact that we infer the relation to hold of "some" rather than 
"al l/most" dogs i s  a consequence of the fact that bark i s  a relation-the "situated­
ness" of the information is what leads to what I call the 'existential inference ' . 9 
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The account therefore predicts that existential readings will be available 
for bare plurals in a "situated" context-i .e . ,  where the bare plural is  an argument 
of a predicate that is a relation (and can thus participate in an Austinian proposi­
tion) as opposed to a type. 
No existential reading is available for arguments of predicates that are 
types (such as dangerous, or the verbal like) . The reason is that such predicates 
can only form Russellian propositions ,  of the form: 
hurricane J cat, mouse I 
dangerous 
and: 
l ike 
Here, because there is no situation, we cannot make the existential inference ,  and 
therefore we cannot get an existential interpretation for hurricanes, cats and mice 
respectively (the latter proposition is  intended to correspond to the sentence Cats 
like mice) . 
3. Adjectival S-level predicates-the missing readings 
The above account predicts ( l ike Carlson and Kratzer/Diesing) that all S­
level predicates (both verbal and adj ectival ones) w i l l  allow existential readings 
for their bare plural subjects. But there are many adjectival S-Ievel predicates 
which do not allow exi stential readings at al l eas i ly, if at all .  (This has been noted 
by Kiss 1 994 and Greenberg 1 994.) Consider, for example: 
( 1 7) Plates were dirty. 
It is  very difficult to get an existential reading for plates here . Now notice how 
things change if we add some discourse context : 
( 1 8) The hotel inspector filed a bad report on Fawlty Towers . The standard of 
service was, he said, disgracefu l .  Plates were dirty, cutlery was bent and 
floors were thick with grease .  
(This example is based on one from Glasbey 1 996.)  And simi larly, it i s  difficult 
to get an existential reading for children i n :  
( 1 9) Children are sick. 
Yet the existential reading i s  obtained without difficulty i n :  
(20) We must get a doctor. Children are sick. 
Once again ,  the effect appears to the result of adding some context .  
If we take these (S-Ievel) predicates to be relations, a s  in  Glasbey 1 995,  
we need to explain, first of al l ,  why the existential reading is not available i n  the 
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first example of each pair, and then why it becomes available with the addition of 
a suitable context, as provided by ( 1 8) and (20) . 
The explanation given i n  Glasbey 1 996 goes briefly as fol lows .  
We saw above that the existential inference (which i s  what makes possi­
ble the existential reading) i s  licensed by presence of a situation supporting the 
relevant infon. For example, in :  
drunk(fireman,T,P) 
we make the existential inference concerning the existence of at least two firemen 
who were/are drunk, l icensed by the presence of a situation S. 
Now, suppose that only certain contexts can supply a situation to support 
the infon. Without such a situation, there can be no existential inference, and thus 
no existential reading. Suppose we then say that in  an "empty context" there is no 
contextually-supplied situation available to support the infon. On the other hand, 
in  cases l ike ( 1 8) and (20) where a context i s  provided, the contextual , descriptive, 
scene-setting material has the effect of providing an appropriate s i tuation to sup­
port the infon .  Hence in  these cases we may make the existential inference, and 
the existential  reading becomes available. 
Thus the context may be seen as having a kind of situating effect-which 
consists of providing an appropriate situation. This situation is what enables the 
existential inference and thus licenses the existential reading. 1o 
We now have to answer the question of why verbal S-Ievel predicates be­
have differently from adjectival S-Ievel predicates-why the former always appear 
to allow existential readings, whatever the context or lack of it . I propose that thi s 
i s  because a verbal S-Ievel predicate always i ntroduces a s ituation, thus allowing 
the exi stential inference, i rrespective of context . 
Why do verbal S-Ievel predicates introduce their own situations? My ex­
planation requires me to associate verbal relations with "events" ( in the David­
sonian sense) ,  i n  a way which we do not want to for adjectival relations .  There 
seems to be something intuitively acceptable about thi s .  For example, we might 
well want to say that: 
(2 1 )  Fido barked. 
introduces (or, at least, can do) a new event into the d iscourse context, while :  
(22) Fido was hungry. 
can be seen as adding more information about an event or situation already present 
in the discourse context (see Glasbey 1 994 for further d iscussion) .  If we think of 
an event as a (certain kind of) situation, we can say that a verbal relation always 
has the potential to introduce a new situation into the context. ( In ST terms, we 
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can identify this as the "minimal situation" or smallest situation supporting the 
relevant infon. See Cooper 1 985 and Glasbey 1 994 for discussion of minimal 
situations . )  
Because adjectival relations do not  introduce new events/situations i nto 
the context, they don' t  automatically give existential readings in the way that ver­
bal relations do. In this case something else (that is, context) i s  needed to introduce 
the required situation. 
4. I-level predicates with existential readings 
Now we can return to the question with which we began this paper-why 
do many I-level predicates allow existential readings for their bare plural subjects 
if (and only if) a certain kind of discourse context is supplied? 
To answer this, I modify the analysis of Glasbey 1 995 and rather than 
classifying I-level predicates as types, now propose to classify them as relations 
which do not supply an event argument. This classification applies to both verbal 
and adjectival I-level predicates .  
We can now say, j ust as we did for the adjectival S-level predicates ,  that 
an existential reading is available for bare plural subjects of I-level predicates iff 
the context supplies a suitable situation to support the relevant infon . Otherwise, 
only the generic reading i s  possible. This explains the observations with which we 
began-that is, the context-dependence of the availabil ity of existential readings 
for bare plural subj ects of I-level predicates. 
5. Conclusion 
To sum up: I propose that all I-level predicates ,  both verbal and adjectival 
ones, correspond to situation-theoretic relations which do not supply their own 
event/situation argument. This means that existential readings are available for the 
bare plural subjects of these predicates only in case the discourse context provides 
a suitable situation to support the infon in  question . If this is the case, then the 
existential reading i s  available. If there is no context -supplied situation, then there 
is no existential reading. Thus the context-dependence of existential readings for 
I-level predicates is accounted for. 
S-level predicates similarly correspond to relations, but they are div ided 
into two classes: first, verbal S-level predicates, which supply their own situa­
tion (or "Davidsonian event argument") and hence always allow an existential 
reading, and second, adjectival S-level predicates, which do not (with a few ex­
ceptions) supply their own situation , and which therefore require the presence of 
a contextually-supplied situation to license the existential reading. 
I have thus accounted for the observations with which we began-the "un­
expected" exi stential readings for bare plural subjects of I-level predicates in cer­
tain contexts-which previous accounts have not been able to explain .  
An important question that remains is that of whether there are any pred­
icates which never allow an existential reading for their bare plural subjects ,  no 
I-LEVEL PREDICATES THAT ALLOW EXISTENTIAL READINGS 
matter what context i s  provided. If such predicates exist, then we may well wish 
to classify them as ST types rather than relations. I have not yet come across any 
such predicates ,  but clearly this question cannot be answered until a much more 
thorough search has been conducted. 
Notes 
* 1  would l ike to thank the participants of Salt VII for their helpfu l  questions 
and comments following the presentation of this paper. I am also gratefu l  to a 
number of colleagues who commented on this work and earlier versions of i t .  
They include Nicholas Asher, Robin Cooper, Manfred Krifka and Carlota Smith. 
The work was supported in the main by an EPSRC postdoctoral fellowship. 
1 Although these latter two authors present distinct accounts, they have much 
in  common and share many assumptions, and I will consider them together for the 
purposes of this paper. 
2Predicting the readings for bare plurals in object position has proved rather 
more difficult . See, for example, (Kratzer 1 988) and (Glasbey 1 995) for d i scus­
sion . 
3My use of the term 'Russel l ian ' is sl ightly d ifferent from that of Barwise 
1 989, who uses it to refer to a proposition that a situation supports an infon,  where 
the situation i s  existentially quantified. 
lThis idea is based on a proposal by Robin Cooper (p.c . ) ,  which was i n  turn 
inspired by Ladusaw 1 994. 
5See McNally 1 995 for an independent but closely-related proposal that bare 
plurals in Spanish should be taken to refer to properties .  
6 1 ignore tense here ,  for simplici ty. I assume that relations have time (T) and 
place (P) argument roles (which need not necessarily be filled in the syntax) .  See 
Glasbey 1 994, ch .3  for discussion . 
7Thus a rel ation l ike bark or chase, for example, can take e ither a parameter 
corresponding to an individual , or a type, as an argument. 
8 It appears that S and S' may be different situations, though i t  seems clear that 
they must be, in some sense, closely related, as must T and T/ , and P and P' . Fur­
ther work i s  needed to determine exactly how they are related. Note that S', T' and 
pi for the different XS need not necessarily be dist inct. There are in teresting is­
sues here regarding the distinction between distributive and collective predicates ,  
which need to be explored further. Here, I make the simplifying assumption that 
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the predicate is  distributive . 
9My proposal is clearly related to Carlson 's ( 1 977) idea that an SLP selects 
the "stage reading" of a kind-my notion of the existential inference being quite 
similar to the idea that bark selects a stage of the kind dogs. Perhaps my account 
of bare plurals can be v iewed in  a certain l ight as a reworking of Carlson 's , within 
a situation theoretic framework, although of course I differ from him in  not using 
stages .  
IOThere are a few adjectival S-level predicates-including present and available­
which appear to allow existential readings irrespective of context. The account in 
Glasbey 1 996 offers an explanation for these. 
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